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Counterfactual and Prefactual Conditionals 
Abstract We consider reasoning about prefactual possibili-
ties in the future, for example, “if I were to win the lottery
next year I would buy a yacht” and counterfactual possibili-
ties, for example, “if I had won the lottery last year, I would
have bought a yacht.” People may reason about indicative
conditionals, for example, “if I won the lottery I bought a
yacht” by keeping in mind a few true possibilities, for
example, “I won the lottery and I bought a yacht.” They
understand counterfactuals by keeping in mind two possi-
bilities, the conjecture, “I won the lottery and I bought a
yacht” and the presupposed facts, “I did not win the lottery
and I did not buy a yacht.” We report the results of three
experiments on prefactuals that examine what people judge
them to imply, the possibilities they judge to be consistent
with them, and the inferences they judge to follow from
them. The results show that reasoners keep a single possi-
bility in mind to understand a prefactual. 
Counterfactuals and Prefactuals
Hypothetical thought is a key characteristic of
human endeavour. The ability to plan and speculate is
important for political and social advancement as well
as scientific discovery (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991).
Hypothetical ideas often rest on thoughts of “if…” and
conditional reasoning occupies centre stage in the
study of deduction. Many studies of conditional rea-
soning examine the inferences that reasoners make
from conditionals, for example:
If there was water on Mars then the planet was capable (1)
of sustaining life.
People readily make the modus ponens inference
from “there was water on Mars” to “the planet was
capable of sustaining life” (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne,
1993). Many make the affirmation of the consequent
inference, from “the planet was capable of sustaining
life” to “there was water on Mars.” People find it hard-
er to make the modus tollens inference, from “the
planet was not capable of sustaining life” to “there was
no water on Mars,” and the denial of the antecedent
inference, from “there was no water on Mars” to “the
planet was not capable of sustaining life.” 
Studies of conditional inference have been limited
by two factors. First, most have focused on the indica-
tive or “certain” mood as in example 1. But people
generate counterfactual conditionals in the subjunctive
or “speculative” mood, for example:
If there had been water on Mars then the planet 
(2)
would have been capable of sustaining life.
Thinking about what might have been is common in
everyday life, especially after bad outcomes (see
Byrne, 2002 for a review). Counterfactuals can help
people to prevent bad outcomes from re-occurring,
and to feel better (Roese & Olson, 1995). Second, most
studies have focused on conditionals about the present
or past (Evans et al., 1993). But people often engage in
conditional reasoning when they generate hypotheses
or predictions about the future. There have been few
studies that focus on future tense conditionals, but one
recent study indicates that reasoners make the same
inferences from past and future conditionals
(Schaeken, Schroyens, & Dieussaert, 2001). In fact,
many “what if…” speculations are not only about the
future but are also in the “uncertain” subjunctive
mood. Our aim in this paper is to consider such “pre-
factuals”, for example:
If water were discovered on Mars in the future, 
(3)
then people would inhabit the planet one day.
We will report the results of three experiments on
how people understand and reason from prefactuals.
First we sketch an explanation of how people reason
about indicative conditionals and counterfactuals. 
Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals
One view is that people reason from conditionals,
for example:
If Mark used tomatoes in the sauce then Fred used basil (4)
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by keeping in mind possibilities (Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 1991, 2002). They think about true possibilities,
for example, “Mark used tomatoes and Fred used
basil.” They do not think about false possibilities, for
example, “Mark used tomatoes and Fred did not use
basil” (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). They think about
just a few true possibilities. They are aware that there
may be alternatives and their interpretation is not
merely conjunctive. However, they do not think about
the alternatives from the outset. They keep in mind
few possibilities because of the limits of working
memory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). 
Reasoners can think about other true possibilities.
On one common interpretation, the biconditional, they
consider two possibilities to be true. “Mark used toma-
toes and Fred used basil,” and “Mark did not use toma-
toes and Fred did not use basil.” On another, the con-
ditional, they consider a third possibility to be true as
well, “Mark did not use tomatoes and Fred did use
basil.” They may come to other interpretations, given
different contents and contexts. The possibilities they
keep in mind are guided by a set of simple principles,
for example, they keep in mind true possibilities, and
few possibilities (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002).  
Reasoners can make inferences by keeping in mind
possibilities. They make modus ponens because the
information, “Mark used tomatoes,” matches the single
possibility they have kept in mind to understand the
conditional. There is no counterexample. There is no
possibility in which the premises are true, “if Mark
used tomatoes then Fred used basil, Mark used toma-
toes,” and the conclusion false, “Fred used basil.”
Reasoners sometimes make the affirmation of the con-
sequent inference because the information, “Fred used
basil,” matches the single possibility they have in
mind. But there is a counterexample, on the condition-
al interpretation. The possibility, “Mark did not use
tomatoes and Fred used basil,” rules out the conclu-
sion, “Mark used tomatoes.” Reasoners who consider
this possibility resist the inference. 
The negative inferences are more difficult. The
information, “Fred did not use basil,” does not match
the single possibility that people have in mind. Many
reasoners say nothing follows. To make modus tollens,
they must consider other true possibilities, for exam-
ple, “Mark did not use tomatoes and Fred did not use
basil.” The information, “Fred did not use basil,”
matches the second possibility, and there is no coun-
terexample. Likewise, the information, “Mark did not
use tomatoes,” does not match the information in the
initial possibility and some reasoners say nothing fol-
lows. If they think about the second possibility, they
will make the denial of the antecedent inference. But
there is a counterexample, on the conditional interpre-
tation. The possibility, “Mark did not use tomatoes and
Fred used basil,” rules out the conclusion, “Fred did
not use basil.” Reasoners who consider this possibility
resist the inference.
Alternative explanations of how people reason from
conditionals are available. One is that people translate
the conditional into an abstract form, for example, “if
A then B” (Braine & O’Brien, 1998; Rips, 1994). To
make the inference from “A” to “B,” they match the
premises, “if A then B, A” to their mental store of for-
mal inference rules. Another alternative is that people
translate the conditional to a domain-specific schema,
for example, “if the cause occurs then the effect
occurs.” To make an inference, they access the
domain-specific rules of inference and match the
premise, “the cause occurs” to deduce the conclusion,
“the effect occurs” (Fiddick, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2000;
Holyoak & Cheng, 1995). However, these alternatives
have not provided a corroborated explanation for how
people reason about counterfactuals, to which we now
turn.
An indicative conditional, for example, “if Oswald
did not kill Kennedy, then someone else did” seems to
mean something very different from the counterfactual,
“if Oswald had not killed Kennedy, then someone else
would have” (e.g., Lewis, 1973). The differences led
philosophers to suggest an analysis in terms of possi-
ble worlds (e.g., Stalnaker, 1968). The differences may
indicate that reasoners construct a richer representa-
tion of alternative possibilities for counterfactuals
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). When people under-
stand a counterfactual, for example:
If Mark had used tomatoes in the sauce then Fred 
(5)
would have used basil
they keep in mind more than the single possibility for
the indicative conditional. Both conditionals are in the
past tense, but the counterfactual is in the subjunctive
mood. When people understand the counterfactual
they think about the conjecture, “Mark used tomatoes
and Fred used basil,” but also about the presupposed
facts, “Mark did not use tomatoes and Fred did not use
basil” (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). They keep track
of the status of the possibilities, noting that one corre-
sponds to the conjecture, and the other to the presup-
posed facts. 
Evidence from various sources corroborates this
suggestion. When people read counterfactuals such as
the one in Example 5, and then were given a surprise
recognition test, they judged that they had been given
assertions such as “Mark did not use tomatoes” and
“Fred did not use basil” (Fillenbaum, 1974). When rea-
soners were asked to say what someone uttering the
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counterfactual meant to imply, they judged the person
meant to imply “Mark did not use tomatoes” and “Fred
did not use basil” (Thompson & Byrne, 2002). When
people read a short story that contained a conditional,
they read the conjunction, “Mark did not use tomatoes
and Fred did not use basil,” far more quickly when
they were primed first with the counterfactual com-
pared to when they were primed with the indicative
conditional (Espino, Santamaria, & Byrne, 2004).
Because reasoners keep in mind several possibilities to
understand the counterfactual, they make different
inferences from it. They make more of the negative
inferences, modus tollens and denial of the
antecedent, from counterfactuals (Byrne & Tasso,
1999). They make the same frequency of the affirma-
tive inferences, modus ponens and affirmation of the
consequent, from counterfactuals and indicative condi-
tionals, which indicates that they do not keep in mind
the negative possibility alone. 
People generate not only counterfactual thoughts
about the past, but also prefactual thoughts about
what might happen in the future (e.g., Roese & Olson,
1995). Prefactuals can vary in how uncertain their
antecedents and consequents are, for example, “if I
were to win the lottery in the future I would buy a
yacht” versus “if I were to die in the future my family
would receive money from my insurance policy.” But
little is known about prefactuals. We report the results
of three novel experiments that examine them. 
Experiment 1: Prefactual Implications
Are conditionals about the future understood differ-
ently from conditionals about the present or the past?
For indicative conditionals, the answer is, no.
Reasoners make the same inferences from conditionals
when they are in the past tense, for example, “if Alicia
was in Athlone then Laura was in Limerick,” the pre-
sent tense, for example, “if Alicia is in Athlone then
Laura is in Limerick,” or the future tense, for example,
“if Alicia is in Athlone tomorrow then Laura will be in
Limerick” (Schaeken, Schroyens, & Dieussaert, 2001).
Reasoners keep in mind a single possibility to under-
stand an indicative conditional, regardless of its tempo-
ral perspective.
But for subjunctive conditionals, the answer is
unknown. Reasoners make the same inferences from
subjunctive conditionals in the past tense, for example,
“if Alicia had been in Athlone then Laura would have
been in Limerick,” or the present tense, for example,
“if Alicia were in Athlone then Laura would be in
Limerick” (Byrne & Tasso, 1999). They are understood
by keeping in mind two possibilities, the conjecture
and the presupposed facts.  Do people keep in mind
two possibilities to understand a prefactual, for exam-
ple, “if Alicia were in Athlone tomorrow then Laura
would be in Limerick?”  We suggest, not. The prefactu-
al does not convey any presupposed facts, and so rea-
soners should not keep in mind the negative possibili-
ty. Our suggestion is that reasoners understand a pref-
actual by keeping in mind a single possibility, “Alicia is
in Athlone and Laura is in Limerick.” The use of the
subjunctive mood ensures that they note the status of
the possibility as a conjecture. They understand the
prefactual by keeping in mind the same possibility as
for the future indicative conditional. They keep track
of the conjectural status of the possibility only for the
prefactual, and so prefactuals may appear more uncer-
tain or improbable. 
In our first experiment, we examined what people
believed a prefactual to imply. We gave participants
the following task:
If I were to win the lottery tomorrow then I would buy a
yacht.
What if anything do you think is implied by this sentence? 
Please tick as many options as you think appropriate.
We provided them with a range of options:
(a) I will win the lottery tomorrow.
(b) I will not win the lottery tomorrow.
(c) I will buy a yacht.
(d) I will not buy a yacht.
(e) Nothing is implied.
We examined fantasy-type realistic contents, for
example, “if I were to win the lottery tomorrow I
would buy a yacht,” as well as more neutral contents,
for example,  “if Alicia were in Athlone tomorrow then
Laura would be in Limerick.”
Method 
Procedure. The problems were presented in a
booklet. The participants were tested in groups and
the experimenter read the instructions aloud and
answered any questions the participants had.
Participants were advised they could take as long as
they needed to complete the task. 
Participants. The participants were 79 undergradu-
ate psychology students from Dublin Business School’s
School of Arts who participated voluntarily. There
were 63 women and 16 men and their average age
was 26 years, ranging from 18 to 41 years. They were
assigned at random to the indicative (n = 43) or the
prefactual group (n = 36).
Materials and design. Participants were given six
problems, three based on neutral contents about
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actions, ingredients, and locations, and three based on
realistic content: “If I were to win the lottery tomorrow
then I would buy a yacht,” “if I were to die tomorrow,
then my family would have enough life insurance,”
and “if I were to become a film star tomorrow then I
would move to Hollywood.” The two sorts of contents
were presented in blocks with half of the participants
receiving one sort first and the other half the other sort
first. The problems within each block were presented
in a different random order to each participant. The
options were presented in a random order for each
problem with the exception that “nothing is implied”
was always last.
We gave one group of participants an indicative set,
based on future indicative conditionals, for example,
“if I win the lottery tomorrow then I will buy a yacht,”
and the second group received a prefactual set based
on future subjunctive conditionals, for example, “if I
were to win the lottery tomorrow then I would buy a
yacht.”
Results and Discussion
The pattern of judgments for indicative and prefac-
tual conditionals was similar, as Table 1 shows. We
examined the results in an ANOVA with the between-
participant factor of mood (indicative, prefactual) and
the within-participant factors of content (neutral, realis-
tic) and possibility (P, not-P, Q, not-Q, nothing). The
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used when the
assumption of sphericity was not met and all tests
reported are one-tailed. 
The ANOVA showed main effects of both content,
F(1,77) = 8.50, MSE = 2.72, p = .01, and possibility,
F(1.56,119.98) = 62.44, MSE = 206.688, p = .00, but not
of group, F(1,77) = 1.61, MSE = 1.79, p = .10. There was
a reliable interaction of content and possibility,
F(1.65,127.36) = 3.93, MSE = 4.72, p = .01, but group
did not interact with content, F(1,77) = .09, MSE = .03, p
= .38, or possibility, F(4, 308) = .64, MSE = .82, p = .32. 
To test our predictions, we carried out planned
comparisons on the nonsignificant three-way interac-
tion, F(4,308) = .05, MSE = .02, p = .50, (see Winer,
1971 for the legitimacy of such comparisons). The only
difference was that participants tended to judge that p
was implied more often for neutral content than for
realistic content, and this difference occurred for the
indicative conditionals, 22% versus 5%, t(42) = 3.52, p
= .00, and the prefactuals, 26% versus 13%, t(35) =
2.17, p = .02. The result shows that reasoners judge
that “if Alicia were in Athlone tomorrow then Laura
would be in Limerick” implies “Alicia will be in
Athlone tomorrow” more often than they judge that “if
I were to win the lottery tomorrow then I would buy a
yacht” implies “I will win the lottery tomorrow.” There
were no other reliable differences, and the judgments
of what the conditional implies were very similar for
the indicative and prefactual groups, and also for the
neutral and realistic contents, as Table 1 shows. 
We also classified participants’ responses as indicat-
ing an “affirmative-possibility” interpretation when
they chose the options corresponding to p or q or both
(and no other option), and we classified them as hav-
ing a “negative-possibility” interpretation when they
chose the options corresponding to not-p or not-q or
both (and no other option) (see Thompson & Byrne,
2002). They were classified as having correctly
answered “nothing is implied” if they selected only
that option, and the majority of participants’ judgments
corresponded to this option, (64%), as Table 2 shows.
Most of the remainder were “affirmative-possibility”
interpretations (22%). As we expected, there were very
few interpretations in the “negative-possibility” catego-
ry (6%).
As Table 2 shows, the interpretations were similar
for indicative and prefactual conditionals. The high
percentage of judgments that “nothing is implied” for
future indicative conditionals (66%) is similar to the
high percentage of such judgments for past indicative
conditionals in other studies (54% in Experiment 1,
Thompson & Byrne, 2002). The equally high percent-
age of judgments that “nothing is implied” for prefactu-
als (63%) is quite different from the percentage of such
TABLE 1
Percentages of Implications in Experiment 1
_____________________________________________________________________
p q not-p not-q Nothing 
_____________________________________________________________________
Indicative Realistic 5 28 9 5 73
Neutral 22 26 6 6 64
Overall 14 27 7 6 69
Prefactual Realistic 13 33 16 8 68
Neutral 26 31 12 10 59
Overall 19 32 14 9 63_____________________________________________________________________
TABLE 2
Percentages of Interpretations in Experiment 1 
_____________________________________________________________________
Affirmative Negative Nothing 
possibility possibility implied_____________________________________________________________________
Indicative Realistic 23 9 62
Neutral 22 3 69
Overall 22 6 66
Prefactual Realistic 24 9 58
Neutral 20 2 67
Overall 22 5 62_____________________________________________________________________
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judgments for counterfactuals (30% in Experiment 1,
Thompson & Byrne, 2002). The judgments of what
prefactuals imply are more similar to judgments about
what indicative conditionals imply than to judgments
about what counterfactuals imply. 
Do people keep in mind two possibilities to under-
stand a prefactual, for example, “if I were to win the
lottery tomorrow I would buy a yacht?” We suggest
they do not, and the results of the experiment corrob-
orate our view that the prefactual does not convey a
presupposed negated antecedent and consequent.
Reasoners do not keep in mind the negative possibili-
ty, “I do not win the lottery and I do not buy a yacht.”
Instead, they appear to understand a prefactual by
keeping a single possibility in mind, “I win the lottery
and I buy a yacht.”  Our next experiment examines the
possibilities that reasoners judge to be consistent with
a prefactual.
Experiment 2: Prefactual Possibilities
The aim of the second experiment was to examine
the possibilities that reasoners judge to be consistent
with prefactuals, for example, “if Linda were in Cork
tomorrow then Cathy would be in Galway.” Each
problem consisted of a conditional premise, followed
by one of four possibilities:
Linda was in Cork and Cathy was in Galway.
Linda was not in Cork and Cathy was not in Galway.
Linda was not in Cork and Cathy was in Galway.
Linda was in Cork and Cathy was not in Galway.
We asked participants to judge whether each possi-
bility was consistent with the conditional, or inconsis-
tent with it, or irrelevant. 
In this experiment, we examined prefactual and
future indicative conditionals, and we compared them
to counterfactual and past indicative conditionals. We
have suggested that reasoners keep in mind a single
possibility to understand the prefactual but two possi-
bilities to understand the counterfactual. We expected
that they would judge as consistent the negative possi-
bility, “Linda was not in Cork and Cathy was not in
Galway,” for the counterfactual more than the prefac-
tual. We concentrated on neutral content, since there
were few differences between it and realistic content
in the previous experiment. 
Method
Procedure. The participants were tested individually
or in groups of two or three participants. The 24 prob-
lems were presented on Macintosh computers using
SuperLab 1.75. The instructions were presented on the
computer and included an example problem and three
practice problems (based on conjunctions and disjunc-
tions of shapes) to familiarize them with the task pre-
sentation and keyboard response options. Participants
were advised they could take as long as they needed
and that they were being timed. Participants pressed
the space bar to view each new piece of information
(the conditional, the possible situation, and the consis-
tency judgment), and each remained on screen to be
joined by the additional information. They pressed one
of the keys labeled “a” “b” or “c” to indicate their judg-
ment. These keys were in the centre of the keyboard
and corresponded to the T, G, and B keys. 
Participants. The participants were 46 undergradu-
ate psychology students from Trinity College, Dublin
University, who took part voluntarily in return for
course credits. There were 33 women and 13 men and
their average age was 20 years (range 18-27 years). 
Materials and design. As in the previous experi-
ment, we included three sorts of neutral content:
ingredients, locations, and actions. We gave one group
of participants a set of problems based on indicative
conditionals, and the other group received subjunctive
conditionals. Each set contained 24 problems, 12 in the
past tense and 12 in the future tense. Each possibility
(p & q, not-p & not-q, not-p & q, p & not-q) was pre-
sented once for each content (i.e., 4 possibilities x 3
contents = 12 problems). To control for content effects,
the contents were assigned to the problems at random
twice to make two different sets of problems. The
order of the problems was controlled in the same way
as the previous experiment.
Results and Discussion
The results corroborated our suggestion that people
keep in mind the negative possibility not-p and not-q
for counterfactuals but not for prefactuals. We ana-
lyzed the results in an ANOVA on the possibilities that
participants selected as “consistent.” The factors were
group (indicative, subjunctive), tense (future, past) and
possibility (p & q, not-p & not-q, not-p & q, p & not-q),
with repeated measures on the last two factors. It
showed a main effect of possibility, F(1.38,60.78) =
213.42, MSE = 175.15, p = .00, 1-tailed, and none of
tense, F(1,44) = 1.36, MSE = .27, p = .13, or group,
F(1,44) = .53, MSE = .53, p = .24. Tense interacted with
group, F(1,44) = 3.49, MSE = .70, p = .03, but not with
possibility, F(1.77, 77.78) = 1.01, MSE = .31, p = .18.
Group and possibility also did not interact, F(3,132) =
.40, MSE = .33, p = .38. 
To test our predictions, we carried out a series of
planned comparisons on the nonsignificant three-way
interaction, F(3,132) = 1.03, MSE = .19, p = .19. They
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showed that participants judged the not-p and not-q
possibility to be consistent more often for the counter-
factual than for the prefactual, although the 12% differ-
ence was marginal (67% vs. 55%, t(22) = 1.62, p = .06),
and the test had 80% power to detect a difference of
.10. There was no such difference for indicative condi-
tionals (55% vs. 57%, t(22) = .23, p = .41), and the test
had 80% power to detect a difference of .11. There
were no reliable differences between counterfactuals
and prefactuals for the comparisons of p and q, p and
not-q or not-p and q, as Table 3 shows. 
The experiment supports the suggestion that people
keep in mind the not-p and not-q possibility when
they think about a counterfactual more often than
when they think about a prefactual.  Our final experi-
ment examines the inferences that reasoners make
from prefactuals. 
Experiment 3: Prefactual Inferences
The aim of the final experiment was to examine the
inferences reasoners make from prefactuals. We gave
participants problems of the following sort:
If Linda were in Cork tomorrow then Cathy would be in
Galway.
Cathy was not in Galway. 
What, if anything, follows?
Therefore  (a) Linda was in Cork
(b) Linda was not in Cork 
(c) Linda may or may not have 
been in Cork.
Once again, we examined prefactual and indicative
future conditionals, and compared them to counterfac-
tual and indicative past conditionals. Because reason-
ers understand the prefactual by keeping in mind a
single possibility, we expected they would make the
same frequency of inferences from prefactuals as from
indicative future conditionals. In contrast, they under-
stand the counterfactual by keeping in mind two pos-
sibilities and so we expected they would make more
of the negative inferences from the counterfactual
compared to the past indicative conditional. We
expected they would make the same frequency of
affirmative inferences from both.
Method
Participants. The participants were 40 members of
the psychology department’s participant panel (mem-
bers of the general public recruited through newspa-
per advertisements). They were paid 8 euro for their
participation. There were 29 women and 11 men and
their average age was 54 years (range from 27 to 74
years). Age details were not available for two partici-
pants. 
Materials, design, and procedure. Each problem
consisted of a conditional and a categorical premise
corresponding to modus ponens (Linda was in Cork),
affirmation of the consequent (Cathy was in Galway),
denial of the antecedent (Linda was not in Cork), and
modus tollens (Cathy was not in Galway). We gave
one group subjunctive conditionals and the other
indicative conditionals. Each set contained 24 prob-
lems, 12 in the past tense and 12 in the future tense.
The same sorts of content were used as in the previ-
ous experiment, and similar controls for content
assignment and order were employed. The procedure
was also similar to the previous experiment. Once
again, participants pressed the space bar to view each
new piece of information (the conditional, the minor
premise, the conclusion set), and each remained on
screen to be joined by the additional information.
Results and Discussion
We analyzed the results in an ANOVA on the
endorsements with the between-participant factor of
group (indicative, subjunctive) and the within-partici-
pant factors of tense (future, past) and inference
(modus ponens, tollens, denial of the antecedent, and
affirmation of the consequent). It showed a main effect
of inference, F(3,114) = 17.81, MSE = 20.35, p = .00, but
none of tense, F(1,38) = .01, MSE = .01, p = .46, or
group, F(1,38) = .37, MSE = 1.25, p = .27. Tense did not
interact with group, F(1,38) = .79, MSE = .80, p = .19, or
inference, F(2.20,83.75) = .33, MSE = .20, p = .37. Group
and inference did not interact, F(3,114) = .66, MSE =
.75, p = .29. 
To test our predictions, we carried out planned
comparisons on the nonsignificant three-way interac-
tion, F(3,114) = .30, MSE = .13, p = .41. As we expected,
participants did not make more negative inferences
from prefactuals compared to future indicative condi-
tionals: modus tollens (57% vs. 63%, t(38) = .51, p =
.31) and denial of the antecedent (62% vs. 57%, t(38) =
.39, p = .35), and these tests had 80% power to detect a
difference of .11 and .10, respectively. There were no
TABLE 3
Percentages of Consistent Possibilities in Experiment 2
_____________________________________________________________________
not-p & p & q p &  not-p 
not-q not-q & q_____________________________________________________________________
Indicative Past 55 99 0 1
Future 57 99 1 3
Subjunctive Counterfactual 67 99 0 12 
Prefactual 55 94 3 6_____________________________________________________________________
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differences for modus ponens (95% in both cases, t(38)
= .00, p = .50), and affirmation of the consequent (73%
and 75%, t(38) = .14, p = .44), and these tests had 80%
power to detect a difference of .03 and .09, respective-
ly. 
In contrast, participants tended to make more of the
negative inferences from the counterfactuals than the
indicative conditionals, as Table 4 shows. However,
the result for modus tollens was only marginally reli-
able (73% vs. 53%, t(38) = 1.51, p = .07), and there was
no difference for the denial of the antecedent (55% vs.
57%, t(38) = .12, p = .45), and these tests had 80%
power to detect a difference of .11 and .08, respective-
ly. Unexpectedly, they made more modus ponens
from counterfactuals (98% vs. 92%, t(28.05) = 1.80, p =
.04), and there was no difference for the affirmation of
the consequent (72% vs. 73%, t(38) = .14, p = .46), and
these tests had 80% power to detect a difference of .03
and .10, respectively. 
We expected that participants would make more of
the negative inferences from the counterfactual than
the past indicative conditional, because they have kept
in mind the negative possibility from the outset. The
results show they make 20% more modus tollens infer-
ences, but only 2% more denial of the antecedent
inferences. Previous studies have found the difference
to be somewhat labile (Byrne & Tasso, 1999) perhaps
because neutral content does not evoke a counterfac-
tual interpretation as often as causal or definitional
content (Thompson & Byrne, 2002). The finding that
participants made 6% more modus ponens inferences
from counterfactuals, and this difference is reliable, is
surprising. Nonetheless, the results are broadly consis-
tent with earlier findings that participants make more
negative inferences from counterfactuals compared to
indicative conditionals (Byrne & Tasso, 1999;
Thompson & Byrne, 2002). More importantly, the
results show that reasoners do not make more nega-
tive inferences from prefactuals compared to future
indicative conditionals.
General Discussion
Prefactual conditionals are curious. People keep in
mind the same possibilities initially to understand a
prefactual, for example, “if I were to become a movie
star tomorrow I would move to Hollywood” as they do
to understand the corresponding future indicative con-
ditional, “if I become a movie star tomorrow I will
move to Hollywood.”  They think about just a single
possibility, “I become a movie star and I move to
Hollywood.” They can think about other possibilities if
need be, but their initial representation keeps just this
possibility in mind. We have corroborated this sugges-
tion in three experiments using three different tasks
known from previous research to differentiate between
indicative and subjunctive conditionals in the past
tense (e.g., Thompson & Byrne, 2002). The first exper-
iment showed that reasoners judge that someone utter-
ing a prefactual means to imply the same thing as
someone uttering a future indicative conditional. The
second experiment showed that reasoners judge the
same sorts of possibilities to be consistent with a pref-
actual as with a future indicative, and the negative
possibility is judged to be consistent with a counterfac-
tual more often than a prefactual. The third experiment
showed that reasoners make the same frequency of
inferences from a prefactual as from a future indica-
tive, and they do not make more of the negative infer-
ences from prefactual conditionals, unlike counterfac-
tual conditionals. 
A prefactual does not presuppose any facts, for
example, “I do not become a movie star and I do not
move to Hollywood.” In this respect, prefactuals are
very different from counterfactuals. What does the sub-
junctive mood add to a future tense conditional? The
“uncertain” mood can cue reasoners to understand that
the status of the affirmative possibility for the prefactu-
al is conjectural. As a result, a prefactual may seem to
be more uncertain than a future tense conditional.
Prefactuals may be well suited to conveying unlikely
possibilities such as speculations and fantasies, where-
as future tense conditionals may be better suited to
plans and predictions. Their understanding and use is
deserving of future study. 
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TABLE 4
Percentages of Conclusions Endorsed in Experiment 3
_____________________________________________________________________
Modus Denial of Modus Affirmation of
tollens the antecedent ponens the consequent_____________________________________________________________________
Past Indicative 53 55 92 72
Counterfactual 73 57 98 73
Future Indicative 57 62 95 73
Prefactual 63 57 95 75_____________________________________________________________________
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Les auteurs se penchent sur le raisonnement con-
cernant des possibilités préfactuelles (exemple : si je
devais gagner à la loterie l’an prochain, j’achèterais un
yacht) et les possibilités contrefactuelles (exemple : si
j’avais gagné à la loterie l’an dernier, j’aurais acheté un
yacht.). Les individus raisonnent aussi à l’indicatif con-
ditionnel (exemple : si j’ai gagné à la loterie, j’ai acheté
un yacht) en gardant à l’esprit quelques possibilités
réelles (exemple : j’ai gagné à la loterie et j’ai acheté
un yacht). Ils comprennent les contrefactuels en gar-
dant à l’esprit deux possibilités, la conjecture (j’ai
gagné à la loterie et j’ai acheté un yacht) et les faits
présumés (je n’ai pas gagné à la loterie et je n’ai pas
acheté de yacht). Les auteurs rendent compte des
résultats de trois expériences sur les possibilités pré-
factuelles visant à examiner ce que les individus con-
sidèrent que ces dernières sous-entendent, les possibi-
lités qu’ils jugent conformes à elles et les inférences
qui s’ensuivent à leur avis. Les résultats indiquent que
les raisonneurs gardent à l’esprit une seule possibilité
afin de comprendre un préfactuel.
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